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STATE,V1ENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Julian ~v1artin Valencia pleaded guilty to battery 
with the intent to commit a serious felony (rape). Mr. Valencia later filed a motion to 
withdraw his guilty p!ea, which the district court denied. The district court imposed a 
unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed. On appeal, Mr. Valencia asserts the 
district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Valencia asserted that he presented a just reason to 
withdraw his guilty plea because he was misinformed about whether he could be 
charged as a persistent violator. Therefore, his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary. He also asserted that the district's court's finding that granting the motion 
would prejudice the State was incorrect, and that the district court applied the wrong 
standard in evaluating his motion. 
The State argues that Mr. Valencia did not present a just reason to withdraw his 
guilty plea because if he had not entered a guilty plea, the State could have filed a 
persistent violator enhancement. The State asserts that Mr. Valencia's argument to the 
contrary fails because it is based on a factual error. While the Appellant's Brief does 
contain a factual error (the charges that were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement 
were charged in a separate case, not in the same indictment as stated in the Appellant's 
Brief), that fact is not relevant to his argument, so the error is immaterial. The same law 
and analysis still applies. In other words, Mr. Valencia's argument did not hinge on the 
erroneous factual statement; the correct facts support the same argument. The State 
overlooks this. The State also fails to meaningfully address the issue of the district 
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court's misguided understanding of the issue of prejudice to the State. Therefore, the 
State's arguments fail. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceed in s 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Valencia's Appellant's Brief. However, because some of the facts were 
unintentionally misstated, the facts relevant to the misstatement are repeated here, and 
the necessary correction is summarized. 
On the night Mr. Valencia allegedly committed the battery against Ms. Negrete, 
he was with Ms. Negrete and his girlfriend (Ms. Munoz) at Ms. Munoz's home. (R., p.6.) 
There were three no-contact orders between Mr. Valencia and Ms. Munoz. (R., p.7.) 
As a result, Mr. Valencia was originally charged, in Case No. CR 2013-2874-C 
(hereinafter, first case), with battery with intent to commit a serious felony to wit: rape, 
and felony violation of a no-contact order. (See Complaint: R., pp.8-10.) He was also 
charged, by separate information, in Case No. CR 2013-5380-C (hereinafter, second 
case), with three counts of felony violation of no-contact orders. (See Idaho Data 
Repository, Canyon County Case No. CR 2013-5380.) 
Before the preliminary hearing, the State filed a Superceding Indictment in the 
first case: the violation of a no-contact order was included in that indictment, but it was 
stricken.1 (R., pp.20-21.) Mr. Valencia was offered two plea agreement options: (1) a 
binding Rule 11 agreement for both cases or (2) an offer to plead guilty to the battery 
charge, in the first case only, and have the second case dismissed. (Tr. 7/11/13, p.5, 
1 It is not clear when or how that charge was stricken from the indictment. The change 
of plea hearing transcript does not bear this out. 
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Ls.10-18.) He chose the latter. (Tr. 7 i11 /13, p.5, Ls.19-25.) Therefore, in July of 2013, 
Mr. Valencia entered an A!ford2 plea to the charge of battery with intent to commit a 
serious felony, and the State agreed to dismiss the second case and recommend four 
years fixed with the indeterminate portion of the sentence to remain open for argument. 
(Tr. 7 / 11 / 1 3, p. 7, L. 1 9 - p. 1 0, L .4.) 
In the Respondent's Brief, the State correctly points out that there is a factual 
error in the Appellant's Brief. (Resp. Br., pp.13-14.) The brief mistakenly stated that the 
two felony charges (battery with intent to commit a serious felony and violation of a no-
contact order) were part of the same indictment, and, by pleadino guilty to the battery 
charge, the State would dismiss the no-contact order charge. (App. Br., pp.10-11.) In 
fact, the charges for violations of no-contact orders were part of the second case that 
was dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. (See Tr. 7/11/13, p.4, L.4 - p.8, L.2.) 
The State points out that the Superceding Indictment did not ultimately include the 
violation of a no-contact order charge. (Resp. Br., pp.13-14.) That charge was included 
in the Complaint and the Superceding Indictment, but it was ultimately stricken from the 
Superceding Indictment. (See R., pp.8-10, 20-21.) 
2 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Valencia's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Valencia's Motion To 
Withdraw His Guiit Plea 
A Introduction 
Mr. Valencia asserts the district cowi abused its discretion when it denied his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea because he presented a just reason to withdraw his 
guilty plea, and there would have been no prejudice to the State if the district court 
granted his motion. Mr. Valencia presented a just reason to withdraw his plea because, 
based on the inaccurate representations of counsel as to whether he could be charged 
as a persistent violator, he did not understand his options, and, therefore, his plea was 
not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Also, allowing Mr. Valencia to withdraw his plea 
would not have prejudiced the State; exercising a constitutional right to a jury trial, and 
requiring the State to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt - even if it requires the 
victim to undergo the experience of testifying or being uncertain of the outcome - does 
not amount to "prejudice." 
The State fails to meaningfully address the prejudice issue in its Respondent's 
Brief. Instead, the State argues that Mr. Valencia could have been charged as a 
persistent violator, and, therefore, he did not demonstrate a just reason to withdraw his 
guilty plea. The State's argument fails because the persistent violator enhancement 
could not have applied to Mr. Valencia. 
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B. The State's Ar ument That Mr. Valencia Failed to Meet His Burden Of 
Demonstratin] A Just Reason To Withdraw His Guilty Plea Fails Because 
fv1r. Valencia Could Not Have Been Charged As A Persistent Violator 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Valencia argued that he had a just reason to 
withdraw his guilty plea because his original counsel told him he could be charged as a 
persistent violator, when in fact he could not. (App. Br., pp.10-11.) As explained above, 
in its response, the State correctly points out that there is a factual error in the 
Appellant's Brief. (Resp. Br., pp.13-14.) 
The State argues that, because the second case alleged felony violations of no-
contact orders, Mr. Valencia could have been charged as a persistent violator. (Resp. 
Br., p.14.) But this argument overlooks the rule that convictions resulting from the 
same course of conduct do not count towards establishing persistent violator status. 
State v. f1arrington, 133 Idaho 563, 565 (Ct. App. 1999). And the no-contact order case 
that the State relies on was not a result of conduct that took place on a different day or 
in a different place. Indeed, the no-contact order violations arose because Mr. Valencia 
was at his girlfriend's apartment, where the battery allegedly occurred. (R., p.6.) 
Therefore, despite the fact that the charges were not part of the same information or 
indictment, under the rule in Harrington, because they arose out of the same incident, 
they could not be used to establish persistent violator status. 
The Harrington Court explained the "general rule" as follows: "convictions 
entered the same day or charged in the same information should count as a single 
conviction for purposes of establishing habitual offender status." Id. (quoting State v. 
Brandt, 110 Idaho 341, 344 (Ct App. 1986)). In Harrington, the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the district court's holding that the persistent violator enhancement did not 
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apply to Harrington, even though he "admitted that he conspired to burglarize an 
Arkansas Piggly VViggly and did burglarize the same store ten days prior." Id. 
(emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). It went on to say that "Harrington's convictions 
were basically separate parts of a common plan or scheme and obviously could have 
been charged in one information thus placing him squarely within the general rule 
articulated in Brandt." Id. (emphasis added). Clearly, the same is true here. In fact, 
before the count was stricken, the Superceding Indictment in this case did charge 
Mr. Valencia with felony violation of a no-contact order. (R., pp.20-21.) 
Therefore, even if Mr. Valencia had gone to trial in each case, and convictions 
were subsequently entered on different days, by different judges, the rationale behind 
the general rule would still have applied. That rationale is to allow "a defendant a 
chance to rehabilitate himself between convictions" and assure that a defendant who 
commits "multiple felonies in one course of conduct, is not unfairly sentenced as a 
persistent violator." Id. 
That rationale was not applicable where the Court of Appeals first discussed this 
rule. See Brandt, 110 Idaho at 344. There, Mr. Brandt escaped while awaiting 
sentencing for three felony offenses. Id. at 342-43. He was soon apprehended and 
later convicted of escape, injury to jail property, assault, and robbery as a result of his 
escape. Id. Because he was a persistent violator, he was sentenced to twenty years 
for the escape. Id. at 343. On appeal, he argued that he should not have been charged 
as a persistent violator because his "three previous felony convictions had been entered 
in a single proceeding all on the same day." Id. at 344. The Court of Appeals held that 
the district court did not err when it found that Mr. Brandt was a persistent violator 
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because the three previous offenses '\vere charged in three separate informations and 
each charge represented a separate crime occurring in a separate location with a 
separate victim. One of the crimes took place in February, 1984, and the other two 
crimes in January, 1984." Id. In other words, the crimes were not the resuit of one 
course of conduct. Thus the persistent violator charge was proper. 
Here, the State argues that because Mr. Valencia's charges were not entered in 
the same indictment, had different case numbers, and were before different judges, 
Mr. Valencia could have been charged as a persistent violator. (Resp. Br., pp.13--14.) 
While it is true that the Appellant's Brief mistakenly asserted that the charges were 
entered in the same indictment, it is not true that Mr. Valencia's "entire argument" 
depends on this mistake. (See Resp. Br., p.13.) The fact that the two cases were in 
front of different judges and had different case numbers is not dispositive. Indeed, the 
two cases originated from the same course of conduct and certainly could have been 
charged in one information or indictment, just as in Harrington. As the Court of Appeals 
stated in Harrington, "Admittedly, the charges have separate case numbers and 
separate informations, although filed simultaneously, but we cannot allow the state of 
Idaho to circumvent the general rule of Brandt simply because an Arkansas prosecutor 
declined to consolidate these cases." 133 Idaho at 566. 
Here, the State points out that the district court "noted that it appeared 'there was 
never any threat by the State to file the persistent violator because that was not part of 
the plea agreement[,] and the prosecutor agreed, stating '[i]t was not part of the plea 
agreement."' (Resp. Br., p.6.) In fact, the transcript for the Change of Plea hearing 
shows that agreeing not to charge Mr. Valencia as a persistent violator was part of the 
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plea agreement. When the district court asked Mr. Valencia if any other promises had 
been made to him, he said "Just the fact that the persistent violator won't be filed." The 
district court then said "Okay. Is that part of the agreement," and the prosecutor replied 
"Yes, Judge." (Tr. 7/11/13, p.15, Ls.4-9.) 
In sum, Mr. Valencia's original counsel advised him to plead guilty to avoid 
persistent violator status. But it is clear that Mr. Valencia was never at risk of that. 
Therefore, his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and he presented a just 
reason to withdraw his plea. 
C. The State Fails To Meanin fully Address The District Court's Misunderstanding 
Of The principle Of Prejudice To The State And The Ar ument That The District 
Court Disre arded The Fact That Mr. Valencia Tried To File His Motion To 
VVithdraw His Plea Before He Saw The PSI 
The State acknowledges that the district court never found that Mr. Valencia 
failed to show a just reason to withdraw his plea but argues that "such a finding is 
implicit in the denial of Valencia's motion to withdraw his plea." (Resp. Br., p.11, n.6.) 
This is belied by the district court's findings at the hearing. The State also admits that 
the district court "did not explicitly address" the argument made by Mr. Valencia's 
counsel that Harrington applied to this situation. (Resp. Br., p. 10.) The absence of any 
discussion of these issues, and the district court's reliance on the timing of 
Mr. Valencia's motion, as well as its finding that granting the motion would prejudice the 
State actually implies, if it implies anything, that the district court did believe that 
Valencia had presented a just reason to withdraw his plea. Otherwise, it could have 
simply denied the motion based on a finding that he had not met his burden of 
presenting a just reason. 
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As covered in detail in the Appellant's Brief, the district court either forgot or 
ignored the fact that Mr. Valencia had tried to file his motion to withdraw his plea several 
times before the PSI was ever available. (See App. Br., pp.11-14.) The only reason he 
had to file the motion after the PSI was available was because he had trouble 
communicating with his original attorney. Indeed, his handwritten motion to withdraw 
his plea was dated September 21, 2013, and he could not have seen his PSI until 
September 27, 2013. (App. Br., p.12.) 
Finally, the district court's belief that Mr. Valencia had presented a just reason to 
withdraw his plea is also supported by the fact that the district court focused on the idea 
that there would be prejudice to the state if it granted the motion. This finding allowed 
the district court to deny the motion even though Mr. Valencia had met his burden of 
presenting a just reason to withdraw his plea. See Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 61 
(2004) (holding that if the state can show prejudice as a result of the withdrawal, a 
motion to withdraw the plea will be denied). In its Respondent's Brief, the State makes 
no attempt to rebut the argument that the district court erred when it found there would 
be prejudice to the State if the motion was granted because the victim would have to 
testify. (See App. Br., pp.14-16.) Instead, the State simply relies on the district court's 
statements about the issue. (Resp. Br., p.15, n.7.) The calling of witnesses does not 
prejudice the State and does not overcome Mr. Valencia's right to a trial and to confront 
the witnesses against him. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Valencia respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of 
conviction and remand his case to the district court with direction to grant his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. 
DATED this 19th day of March, 2015. 
REED P. ANDERSON ,, 
Deputy State Appellate ~ublic Defender 
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